An Interview with Dr. William Ruger

William Ruger is the President of the American Institute for Economic Research and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

SALIENT: What is the greatest threat to American foreign policy?

Dr. RUGER: The greatest threats to American flourishing are actually our domestic problems. Our fiscal policy challenges, particularly our debt, are both an economic problem and a national security problem. Wokeness and identity politics writ large are also tearing our country apart. Furthermore, the growth of the size and power of the federal and state governments is dangerous to our well-being and to our liberties. Considering these domestic challenges, I think we should be cautious about assuming that our biggest dangers come from abroad.

That being said, America faces numerous international threats. The foremost of these are terrorist organizations that have both the intent and capability to harm the United States. However, we have to be careful about overreacting to terrorist groups that cannot or do not wish to hurt us. The global war on terrorism was problematic for just this reason: a lot of terrorism is not directed against us, and many terrorist organizations lack the ability to inflict significant harm. We have limited resources to deal with terrorism, and we want to deploy these resources wisely by prioritizing real threats.

Another challenge is our relationship with China. China is not purely an enemy—for instance, they’re an important trading partner—but they are an adversary in other areas. We need to take a Goldilocks approach that is not too hot or too cold. While we should push the Chinese on certain issues, we also must recognize that we engage in a lot of mutually beneficial trade with China. Chinese cooperation can also help us to handle major international challenges. For example, if China did more to combat international piracy, we would not have to bear the burden alone.

SALIENT: Do you envision the creation of a joint US-Chinese Task Force?

RUGER: I don’t think a formal joint task force is necessary: China shares the burden of upholding international security. For instance, the Chinese have a great interest in making sure that shipping is not being molested as it goes through the Straits of Malacca. I don't think the United States should try to bear every burden in the world. Neoconservatives argue that unless a hegemon provides public goods for a system, the system will collapse. I'm not sure that statement is true. Scholars like Bob Gilpin argue that hegemonies eventually decline because bearing the cost of the public goods weighs them down. Other people take advantage of this weakness, and so the hegemon falls as part of a cycle. I don't want America to fall. We want to be the strongest and most successful country in the world. To achieve this, we need to make sure we don't overextend ourselves and allow others, particularly wealthy European nations, to freeride on the United States.

SALIENT: Are there any nations with which the United States should seek a closer partnership, either through a formalized alliance, like NATO, or a more informal relationship?

RUGER: I generally think that we should try to pivot out of some of our formal security commitments rather than pivoting in. That said, it is ridiculous to accuse me and other restrainers of isolationism. None of the so-called “isolationists” wants to stick his head in the sand or retreat from the world.

For instance, I believe that robust international trade is good for the United States. We should try to find ways to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements to free some of our trade, particularly with countries with whom we have other good reasons to partner. For example, we should have a bilateral free trade agreement with the UK and Switzerland and should also continue to advance positive relationships with India.

Ultimately, I don’t think any restrainers oppose forming trading relationships or working on a case-by-case basis to deal with transnational challenges. For that reason, the charge of isolationism is merely pejorative slander. This term doesn't help us to understand the core of the debate; instead, it just narrows conversation. Restrainers should not be so easily dismissed. Even if we're wrong, it’s important that the foreign policy establishment wrestle with our perspective. Restrainers foreign force policymakers to ask questions about costs, about tradeoffs, about identifying and prioritizing real threats. We are a valuable part of the conversation.

Moreover, I'm not someone who believes we should follow restraint, period, no matter what the strategic environment. For instance, you could argue that restraint wasn't the most appropriate grand strategy from the late 1940s until about 1960, or even to 1989. On the other hand, restraint was the best approach from Washington's administration until World War Two, and restraint is the best strategy today. As a realist, I try to look at the world as it is, to understand the geostrategic facts, in order to assess whether or not restraint is the best approach. At this moment in time, particularly in light of the nuclear revolution, restraint is the best strategy for the American people to secure our vital national interests.

SALIENT: How would you suggest the United States decrease her entanglements without ensuring the strengthening or elevation to prominence of forces hostile to the United States? For instance, the Mujahideen, whom we funded back during the Cold War, became hostile to us right after we stopped helping them.

RUGER: Real challenges arise from rapid changes in the international system. We need to be careful of hasty withdrawal; at the same time, because of political dynamics, we aren’t always able to slowly retrench. Ultimately, prudence is going to have to dictate how quickly you would retrench or reload.

While I can’t give you an all-encompassing law, I do think we ought to be promoting greater burden sharing with our NATO allies in Europe with the goal that, eventually, Europe would take primary enforcement for its security and not rely on the United States to the extent it does today. As long as we're paying the bills, and as long as we can't credibly threaten to leave, it's no wonder that Europe passes the buck and free rides. Shifting this burden may require a more dramatic change in our strategic posture.

There's no reason why Europe shouldn't be able to successfully deter important security its most challenges. Europe’s southern borders are not a huge security threat except for the 11 challenge of terrorism. Then, the main threat to Europe is Russia. The combined GDP of the European Union countries alone, and their population, swamps that of Russia. Europe should be able to defend itself. This change would be very beneficial for the U.S. First, in spending far less on international defense, we could begin to address our own debt and deficit problems. Second, we could focus on issues more closely connected to our vital interests, like the rise of China.

SALIENT: Do you think that American foreign policy would be strengthened if, instead of always insisting on boots-on-the-ground interventions, we worked to stop threats before they became big issues?

RUGER: Yes. I think, for instance, that President Trump was absolutely correct in agreeing to the Doha Accord and in withdrawing from Afghanistan. I think, too, that President Biden should get a little credit for actually fulfilling the accord, although implementation was his terrible. Really, though, this was Trump's initiative and should be counted as one of his successes. Leaving Afghanistan didn't mean surrendering our ability to protect ourselves against terrorist organizations. We can use special forces and over-the-horizon capabilities to meet our needs there, and we don't have to have permanent basing and large good order and 12 footprints in order to do that. The United States has largely been able to accomplish its counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan, after the withdrawal. And how many Americans have died in Afghanistan since we left? Zero. This outcome reveals the virtues of restraint in overseas interventions.

Of course, this doesn't mean that special operations are a silver bullet that will solve every problem. Sometimes, the use of covert forces or special operations forces can create problems. For example, I don't think that the United States should have forces in Syria. In general, I think we should be much more cautious about the use of American military power in the Middle East and Africa. We need to do a real cost-benefit analysis to determine whether we should have even small-footprint forces there, especially because we often get entwined in local conflicts that have little to do with the United States.

SALIENT: Can you speak to the prevalence of woke, leftist ideology in the US military today? How would we go about addressing this phenomenon?

RUGER: I'm not an expert on manpower issues, but I'm certainly concerned when I see the recruitment numbers that you're seeing, and in particular when I see which groups aren't signing up to the same extent as in the past. We don’t want to lose those potential recruiting bases unnecessary because of changes in the military, changes that actually undermine discipline. Allowing identity, wokeness, and politics to enter the military divides people who should be working together. They're Americans first, and everything else second. Promoting political agendas distracts from the mission first mentality and harms morale. Wokeness in the military, then, is a real concern.

At the same time, the whole country is embroiled in the wokeness debate, so it's not surprising that these ideas have entered into the military. We should respect the moral dignity of all Americans, no matter their views; as long as they're able to meet the requirements of their job, they should be allowed into the military. Respecting others’ views, however, does not mean we should allow wokeness to penetrate the military in a way that's deleterious to our mission as Americans in uniform.

SALIENT: With respect to America's current political will, do you think it's possible to successfully defeat an insurgency?

RUGER: There are some examples of successful counterinsurgency, but it's very hard. The British networks were fairly successful in Malaya. The Sri Lankan government, after not doing very well initially, is pretty successful against the Tamils. While success is possible, we should consider the old saying from the Battle of Algiers: “If you will the ends, you will the means.” In some cases, I don't think that the means would be consistent with our political culture writ large. For example, we care a lot about the protection of innocent noncombatants, of certain rights that journalists might have in a war zone. Many of the measures that Sri Lanka took to be successful, for instance, are not easily replicable by the US. When you engage in foreign policy activities, you have to think about what would actually be supported at home.

For example, would the American public really support what it would take to fight China over Taiwan? It's a question we have to ask ourselves, because the decline of support for Vietnam certainly detracted from our ability to accomplish our mission there. Similarly, in the case of insurgency, are we willing to use force, or will we adhere to our liberal ideals?

We also must consider whether we are willing to suffer manpower costs. One reason why we left Afghanistan was that we were losing men and material but didn't see a clear path forward to success. Finally, we did a cost benefit analysis and made the correct decision: withdrawal. We need to do the same sort of analysis in the case of insurgents.

We must also remember that insurgents are playing on their home turf and often understand the culture and language better. As the old saying goes, “We have watches, and they have the time.” Insurgents are going to be in a place for a long time and have a much greater stake in it.

Nationalism is also an important factor. It's one thing for the Sri Lankan government to engage in counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka; it's quite a different matter when the United States engages in counterinsurgency abroad, even when we have a local partner. In Afghanistan, we had a local partner that did not command much respect and didn't have a lot of authority around the country as a whole, as we saw.

SALIENT: What distinction do you draw between the US occupation of Afghanistan and the post-WWII occupation of Germany and Japan? Was our strategy in Germany and Japan, where we spent a much longer time and, in part because of that, saw some great benefits, not feasible in Afghanistan?

RUGER: These situations are radically different. Germany and Japan were obviously illiberal, but they were still modern countries. Both were industrially culturally and advanced and had traditional ties, especially in the case of Germany, with the West. As a result, there was a much stronger foundation on which to build. Afghanistan, however, faces more and deeper challenges. Afghanistan is not a heavily industrialized country. In fact, it's one of the poorest countries on the planet. Afghanistan is not a Western country; liberalism and democracy are very foreign to it. It has a very difficult neighborhood. It has ethnic cleavages that create significant challenges, and its political culture is deeply corrupt. I think failure, in many ways, is overdetermined.

We should also remember that the specter of the Soviet Union heightened the United States’ interest in spending resources to reconstitute Japan and Germany. This was not in play in Afghanistan, right?

SALIENT: Is it fair to say that you don't see a real threat to the United States from the rise of BRICS?

RUGER: What do we mean when we say threat? Am I ready to build a bunker in the backyard? Is it going to be Red Dawn? No, I don't think that that's all we have to worry about. This is not to say that there aren't threats posed by the states. Again, though, I think you have to put these challenges in context and think about tradeoffs and prioritization. As Calvin Coolidge once said, “If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you.” You need to be prepared to deal with the one problem that does come to you. We need to avoid being overly aggressive so that we can harbor our strength and deal with the most salient threats. And so, for instance, I think that the Ukraine War has only proven how weak Russia is. Russia is hardly a 600-pound gorilla that will soon threaten to be in the Dover Straits. For one thing—even if it could defeat Ukraine, even if it could be a threat to Poland or to Germany—the French would nuke the shit out of it.

This interview originally appeared in Home Front, the February 2024 print issue of the Salient.